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This paper investigates how the integration of local banking markets affects the credit and 
economic cycle of local economies by using both a data set on the branch network of nation-
wide city banks and a prefecture-level panel data set on the formation and collapse of the real 
estate bubble in Japan. The empirical results show that the presence of city banks does not seem 
to have lessened the effects of local financial shocks on local economies. On the contrary, we 
find evidence that nation-wide city banks aggressively transmitted financial shocks that 
originated from major cities to local peripheral economies. These results suggest a dark side of 
large nation-wide banks: they can be a source of financial and economic volatility when they 
elect to take concentrated risk and spread out the impacts of large financial shocks to peripheral 
economies. 
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1.  Introduction 
The relation between banking integration and the vulnerability of economies to financial shocks 
has been one of the most important issues in the realm of macroeconomics and finance. In theory, 
geographical diversification of banking across local economic boundaries could cause both 
higher and lower volatility in the economy. On the one hand, the financial health of large 
diversified banks does not depend on idiosyncratic local conditions as much as the health of local 
banks does. Hence, the large diversified banks might be able to take up the slack when local 
financial shocks (e.g., land price shocks) undermine the health of local banks and their ability to 
satisfy local financing needs. In this case, the presence of large diversified banks helps mitigate a 
local credit crunch. 
On the other hand, adverse financial shocks reduce the value of borrowers’ collateral and 
thus worsen their creditworthiness, which might prompt large financial institutions to shift 
capital away from the affected market to the other markets where the perceived quality of 
borrowers is higher. Hence, large institutions’ access to a large pool of borrowers in different 
geographical areas might raise the likelihood of a “flight to quality”, which, in turn, might result 
in a volatile flow of capital from one economy to the others and potentially amplify the local 
credit cycle.  
Furthermore, if large financial institutions choose to take concentrated risk in one or two 
markets, financial shocks that originate from those markets can undermine their financial 
soundness and, as a consequence, impair their ability to supply credit in other markets. That is, 
banking consolidation may well be a source of volatility in local credit markets if large 
institutions fail to manage risk properly.
1 
                                                            
1  Two relevant issues on the risk management of large institutions are worth pointing out. First, geographical 
diversification does not always lead to a reduction in insolvency risk because banks might face offsetting incentives.  
  4
The empirical literature on this issue is enormous. To start with, a series of historical 
studies show that integrated banking systems are better: during the Great Depression, banking 
systems with geographically diversified banks tended to be more stable than unit banking 
systems (e.g., Grossman, 1994; Mitchener, 2005) and also banking instability was strongly 
correlated with the contraction of credit and output (Bernanke, 1983; Calomiris and Mason, 
2003).  
The empirical work based on branching deregulation in the U.S. also corroborates the 
historical experience, suggesting that banking consolidation reduced the risk of a localized credit 
squeeze. The analysis of firm-level data shows that banking integration loosened the borrowing 
constraints of bank-dependent firms and lowered firm volatility in non-financial sectors (Correa 
and Suarez, 2007; Correa, 2008). At a macro-level, the integration of the local banking system is 
shown to be positively correlated with long-run local economic performance (Jayaratne and 
Strahan, 1996; Clarke, 2004) and negatively correlated with volatility of local income and 
consumption (Morgan, Rime, and Strahan, 2004; Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sørensen, 2007). 
 While much of the literature supports the positive effects of banking integration, several 
recent studies also show its dark side. Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) find that U.S. branches 
of Japanese banks reduced loan supply and reallocated funds back to Japan in response to the 
financial collapse in Japan in 1990s, which caused a significant economic downturn in U.S. real 
estate markets. Ashcraft (2005) takes a close look at the failure of two large bank holding 
companies, First City Bancorporation and First Republic Bank Corporation. The former failed 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Demsetz and Strahan (1997) show that although geographical diversification allows large bank holding companies 
to reduce the risk of insolvency in principle, these diversified institutions, in reality, exhibit a strong tendency to 
operate with greater leverage and pursue riskier lending, which, in turn, partially offsets the stabilizing effects of 
diversification. Moreover, large financial institutions might enjoy conjectural guarantees of the government since the 
government has strong incentives to rescue those large institutions whose failure is likely to pose a system risk. Such 
too-big-to-fail policy might promote moral hazard problems and raises banks’ incentive to take excessive risk 
(Morgan and Stiroh, 2005; Furfine, 2006; Stern and Feldman, 2004; Penas and Unal, 2004; O’Hara and Shaw, 1990).   
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due to loan losses on Iraqi banks during the First Gulf War while the latter failed due to the 
FDIC’s unilateral decision not to renew financial assistance. Ashcraft (2005) documents that 
local economic output declined when the subsidiaries of these failed banks were also closed 
down. 
More recently, Chava and Purnanandam (2008) examine the exogenous shock to the U.S. 
banking system during the Russian crisis in the fall of 1998 and find that U.S. domestic firms 
that were more dependent on banks with large exposure to the shock suffered from the larger 
valuation loss. Similarly, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) investigate the liquidity constraints 
across domestically and globally-oriented banks and find that while globally-oriented banks rely 
on internal capital markets to help smooth the shock, such internal capital markets also 
contribute to the international propagation of domestic liquidity shocks. Hence, while it is 
commonly thought that monetary shocks affect foreign economies through the interest rate 
channel (e.g. Mackowiak, 2007, di Giovanni and Shambaugh, 2008), these results suggest the 
presence of an alternative bank lending channel in which these shocks can be transmitted 
internationally. 
This paper makes a contribution to this literature by examining both the possible negative 
and positive effects of banking integration on local credit and economic cycles with panel data of 
Japan’s prefectures from 1980 to 2003. Like Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) and Demyanyk, 
Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007), we explore whether the presence of nation-wide city banks 
mitigates adverse effects of local financial shocks on local credit conditions and economies. In 
addition, like Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), Ashcraft (2005), Chava and Purnanandam 
(2008), and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008), we examine whether nation-wide banks spread out 
the effects of financial shocks in the locality of their headquarters to peripheral local economies.   
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We undertake this task by making use of the information on the branch network of city 
banks and changes in land prices of commercial sites of each prefecture and the major cities. Our 
data set contains rich cross-sectional and time series variation in the banking structure and land 
price movements that allows us to estimate the effects of both local and major city land price 
shocks on local credit conditions and also to test whether the size of these effects depends on the 
local presence of city banks. If nation-wide city banks absorb local financial shocks as suggested 
by Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) and Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007) in the 
U.S. experience, we should observe that the credit condition of financially integrated prefectures 
with a large presence of city banks to be less sensitive to local idiosyncratic financial shocks. 
Similarly, if nation-wide city banks helped to transmit financial shocks from cities to other 
economies as documented by Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), Ashcraft (2005), Chava and 
Purnanandam (2008), and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008), we should find the credit condition of 
financially integrated prefectures to be more sensitive to financial shocks of the cities. 
In addition, we attempt to shed light on the real causal effects of the bank lending channel 
on local economies. Although the presence of the bank lending channel is widely accepted in 
finance/macroeconomic literature (e.g., Bernanke, 1995), there remains a considerable debate on 
its economic importance as recent studies show only small or negligible effects of loan supply on 
output in the case of U.S. economy (Driscoll, 2004, Ashcraft, 2006). We estimate the elasticity 
of output to loan supply in Japan by exploiting the fact that the exposure of each prefecture to 
land price shocks of the major cities is plausibly exogenous to local loan demand after 
controlling for its exposure to local land price shocks. We wish to make a contribution to this 
debate.  
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To briefly summarize our findings, Japan’s banking experience during 1981-2003 
highlights a dark side of banking consolidation. We find that local loan supply was more 
sensitive to city land price shocks in prefectures where city banks had extensive branch 
operations. The change in local loan supply, when instrumented with the interaction of the land 
price shocks of the major cities and the share of city bank branches, had a statistically significant 
and economically important impact on local economies: we find the elasticity to be about 30-
40%. That is, the presence of nation-wide city banks seems to have added volatility to local 
credit and economic cycle in the Japanese case. Moreover, the loan supply shock had larger 
effects on small business firms while large business firms were largely unaffected. These results 
suggest that the results are not spurious since in theory, the loan supply shock should affect only 
those opaque small firms with limited ability to raise funds from uninformed investors. Finally, 
city banks seem not to have utilized internal capital markets to help mitigate a local credit crunch. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our data and empirical 
strategy. Section 3 presents the baseline results, followed by robustness checks in section 4. 
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our findings in relation to the literature. 
 
2.  Data and Empirical Strategy 
A. Land Prices 
  Our primary interest is in testing whether the presence of city banks reduces the effects of 
local financial shocks on local credit conditions and economic performance, and also whether the 
presence of city banks transmits financial shocks from cities to local economies. For this paper, 
we use price indices of commercial sites in each prefecture as a measure of local financial shocks  
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and the price index of commercial sites in six major cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, 
Kyoto and Kobe) as a measure of city financial shocks.  
Changes in real estate markets, in theory, can have significant effects on financial 
intermediations and real economy. Since one of the primary functions of banks is to screen and 
monitor borrowers, banks develop expertise in compiling relevant information to accurately 
evaluate borrowers and also maintain close long-term lending relationships with clients (Sharpe, 
1990; Diamond, 1984, 1991; Rajan, 1992). However, since small firms disclose little information 
and it is difficult for banks to correctly assess their creditworthiness, small firms are often 
required to offer real estate collateral to bridge the informational gap. Thus, real estate often 
works as a buffer against borrowing constraints and mitigates the problem of informational 
asymmetry between banks and firms.  
Given the importance of real estate in overcoming information asymmetry in credit 
markets, large changes in land prices may significantly affect small business lending and 
ultimately performance of small business firms. In addition, when the likelihood of loan default 
rises, the value of bank assets (and thus bank equity) becomes more closely tied to the value of 
the collateral. As a result, when the land market collapses, it will adversely affect the financing 
conditions of banks and their ability to extend credit.  
The empirical literature on the bank lending channel in Japan is broadly consistent with 
this theory. The land prices in Japan changed dramatically from the mid 1980s to 1990s. Banks’ 
financial soundness during this period depended critically on the dramatic change in land prices 
since their assets, especially loans, were closely tied with land values in the form of collateral.
2  
                                                            
2 Bayoumi (2001) use VAR to show that the disruption in financial intermediation caused by the collapse of the 
domestic asset market was the main cause of Japan’s stagnant economy in the 1990s. Using more disaggregated 
bank-level data, Gan (2007), Watanabe (2007), and Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000) show that the large exposure to real 
estate markets was a major determinant of the decline in loan supply of Japanese banks.  
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 Table 1 shows the movement of land prices in 47 prefectures and the six major cities 
during the sample period 1981-2003. From 1981, the land prices rapidly increased until it peeked 
out in 1991 and then it sharply declined after the collapse of the bubble economy in 1991. The 
important feature, for the purpose of our research design, is that the degree of volatility varies, 
significantly, across prefectures. In particular, land price changes are more prominent in 
urbanized areas compared to rural areas. The land prices in economically large prefectures such 
as Tokyo, Aichi and Osaka were tripled over 1981-1991 and dropped down to one-third of its 
peek over 1991-2003. In contrast, the land prices in remote prefectures such as Iwate, Shimane, 
Saga are less volatile and rose only by 50 percent and decreased by 30 percent.  
Moreover, the statistical pattern of the movement of land prices has geographical 
dimensions. Figure 1 illustrates various degrees of the land price decline over 1991-2003 for 47 
prefectures in a map. Those six major prefectures bordered with red lines and their close 
peripheral prefectures experienced more severe declines compared to remote rural areas. 
These land prices are obtained from the Japan Statistical Yearbook by Japan Statistics 
Bureau. Since we are using the land price index of the six major cities as the land price shock to 
city banks, we exclude six prefectures where those cities are located in order to avoid an 
endogeneity problem in the regression analysis that follows.
3  
 
B. Banking Integration 
  As a measure of banking integration, we use a proportion of city bank branches in 
prefecture i to total branches of city banks and regional banks in prefecture i. This data is drawn 
from Nikkin Shiryo Nenpo (Annual Report on Japan’s Financial Institutions) published by the 
Japan Financial News.  
                                                            
3 Six excluded prefectures are Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, Kyoto and Hyogo.  
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Table 2 shows the average city bank share in 47 prefectures over the periods of 1981-
1991 and 1991-2003. The city bank share differs noticeably across prefectures. Figure 2 displays 
the average city bank share over 1991-2003 for 47 prefectures in a map. Again, while the share 
of city banks is acutely high in urbanized prefectures and their peripheral prefectures where city 
bank mainly operate, the share of city banks is fairly low in remote areas where regional banks 
have high presence. 
 
C. Local Lending and Output 
We use the data on bank loans and output at a prefecture-level to match our data on the 
land price index and banking structure. Private loan data is from Kinyu Keizai Tokei Geppo 
(Monthly Report of Recent Economic and Financial Developments) released by Bank of Japan. 
Local output is from Kenmin Keizai Keisan Nenpo (Annual Report of Prefectural Economy) by 
the Cabinet Office. The summary statistics of our data is presented in Table A1 in Appendix.  
 
D. Empirical Strategies 
   We examine the empirical relationship between land price shocks and loans: 
 
12 * it i t it it it Loan LocalLand LocalLand CityBankShare        
  3 * it it it CityLand CityBankShare      (1) 
 
Subscript i indicates the prefecture and t indicates the year. A parameter αi represents prefecture-
specific effects that capture unobserved prefecture-specific (time-invariant) factors that affect 
loan demand in prefecture i. αt represents year-specific effects that capture economy-wide shocks. 
Loan is annual local private loan growth. ΔLocalLand is annual local land price growth. 
ΔLocalLand*CityBankShare is an interaction of the local land price growth and the city bank  
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share. ΔCityLand*CityBankShare is an interaction of the land price growth of the major cities 
and the city bank share. Since the city land price growth does not vary across prefectures, we 
cannot estimate its average effects; i.e., it is automatically captured by time-specific effects. We 
estimate this equation for the period of 1981-2003 and adjust the standard errors for serial 
correlation within prefecture over time (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004).
4 
  As changes in local land prices affect both borrowers’ creditworthiness and local banks’ 
financial conditions, we expect Loan  to be positively correlated with ΔLocalLand. The 
interaction of the local land price growth and the city bank share captures the effects of the 
presence of city banks on sensitivity of local credit conditions to local financial shocks. A priori, 
the sign of this coefficient is ambiguous. On the one hand, since city banks lend nationally, they 
can quickly reallocate capital to a local economy in which local banks are too financially 
constrained to meet local financing needs. In this case, we expect the coefficient on 
ΔLocalLand*CityBankShare to be negative. On the other hand, city bank can also reallocate 
capital away from economically weak prefectures to strong ones if the land price shocks decrease 
profitability of those lending opportunities, which, in turn, increases the sensitivity of credit 
conditions to local land price fluctuations. In this case, we expect the coefficient on 
ΔLocalLand*CityBankShare to be positive. 
The interaction of the city land price growth and the city bank share, 
ΔCityLand*CityBankShare, captures the possible detrimental effects of city bank presence on the 
vulnerability of local credit conditions to city land price shocks. If city banks are forced to 
withdraw funds from local branches to meet a funding shortage caused by the land price shocks 
of cities, prefectures with the higher share of city banks may be more vulnerable to city land 
                                                            
4 We use cluster option in STATA to calculate standard errors that are robust to any arbitrary within prefecture 
correlation.  
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price shocks unless regional banks take the slack of abandoned lending opportunities. In this case, 
we should observe a positive coefficient on ΔCityLand*CityBankShare.  
  Equation (1) investigates whether or not Japan’s city banks effectively transmitted 
financial shocks from the major cities to the credit markets in peripheral economies. The shift in 
the supply of bank loans, however, does not necessarily have real effects on local economies, as 
it depends on the financing opportunities of local borrowers that were served by city banks; i.e., 
if these borrowers can raise funds from non-bank lenders to make up for a funding shortfall, then 
a reduction in loan supply from city banks should have little real effects. In fact, Driscoll (2004) 
and Ashcraft (2006) find that bank lending channel has minimal real effects in the U.S., using 
state-level panel data. More relevant to this paper is Ford et al. (2003), which argues that as 
financial markets have been developed, Japanese firms have become less bank-dependent and 
able to replace a decline in loan supply with alternative financing methods to fund investment 
opportunities so that loan supply shocks do not affect real economic output. Thus, we examine 
whether a disruption of credit supply in local economies indeed has a real effect by estimating 
the following reduced-form equation:   
 
12 * it i t it it it GDP LocalLand LocalLand CityBankShare        
  3 * it it it CityLand CityBankShare     (2) 
 
GDP represents the growth rate of local economic output. If financial shocks that city banks 
transmit have real effects, if any, on output of local economies, then the coefficient on the 
interaction of city land price growth and the city bank share should be positive.  
We also make use of plausibly exogenous variation in bank lending created by city land 
price shocks to estimate the causal effects of the bank lending channel on real output: 
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12 * it i t it it it Loan LocalLand LocalLand CityBankShare        
3 * it it it CityLand CityBankShare         (3) 

12 3 * it i t it it it it it GDP Loan LocalLand LocalLand CityBankShare          (4) 
 
Equations (3) and (4) are the first and second stage of an instrumental variable (IV) regression 
that relates the local credit supply shocks transmitted by city banks to local economic 
performance. We use Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) method as it is shown 
to suffer less from weak instrument problems, compared to Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) 
(Stock and Yogo, 2002). The results of Equation (4) give the elasticity of output with respect to 
loan supply. 
 
3.  Baseline Results 
Table 3 reports the results of fixed-effect regressions of loan growth (Equations (1)) in 
columns 1-2, output growth (Equation (2)) in columns 3-4 and an IV regression (Equation (3) 
and (4)) in column 5. The results show that the coefficients on ΔLocal Land Price are positive 
and statistically significant in the equations for loan growth (columns 1-2). This implies that 
local collateral shocks had direct effects on local lending presumably because the value of 
collateral affected both the willingness and ability of banks to provide loans.  
The coefficient on ΔLocal Land Price*City Bank Share is positive but not statistically 
significant in the equation for loan growth (column 2). This shows that when local collateral 
shocks occurred, city banks did not mitigate the local land price shocks by pumping more capital 
into the local economy but instead they may have reallocated capital away from those weak 
prefectures to strong ones to pursue more profitable lending opportunities. The coefficient on 
ΔCity Land Price*City Bank Share is positive and statistically significant, which suggests that  
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when collateral shocks occurred in cities, city banks reacted to the shocks by reducing loan 
supply in peripheral local economies, and thus aggressively transmitted the adverse effects of the 
shocks across geographical boundaries.  
The magnitude of this coefficient is large enough to be economically meaningful. 
Compare a prefecture with the smallest presence of city banks (e.g., Aomori and Yamagata) with 
a prefecture with relatively large presence of city banks (e.g., Chiba and Hokkaido). For the 
former prefectures, city bank share is about 1% over 1991-2003, which implies that as the price 
index of commercial site in the major cities declined by 197.5% from the peak in 1991 to trough 
in 2003, bank lending declined only by 0.5%. In contrast, the latter prefectures where city bank 
share is about 30%, the same financial shocks in the cities led to 15% decline in bank lending. 
The reduced-form equations for output growth yield consistent results. The coefficients 
on ΔLocal Land Price are positive and statistically significant, reflecting the presence of the 
collateral channel: the negative shock to the value of collateral will result in a decrease in output. 
The coefficient on ΔLocal Land Price*City Bank Share is positive but insignificant while the 
coefficient on ΔCity Land Price*City Bank Share is positive and statistically significant (column 
4). These results are consistent with the view that the negative shocks transmitted by city banks 
have real effects on local economies.  
The results of the IV regression (Panels A and B in column 5) are in accordance with 
those of the reduced-from equations (columns 3-4). The coefficient on Loan, which is 
instrumented with ΔCity Land Price*City Bank Share, is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that the negative shock in local credit markets caused by transmission of the city land 
price shocks by city banks indeed decreased local economic output.   
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Moreover, the estimated elasticity of output with respect to loan supply is about 40%, 
which is again large enough to be economically important. These estimates contrast starkly to 
those found in Driscoll (2004) and Ashcraft (2006), which use the U.S. data to find that the bank 
lending channel does not have important economic effects. There are several possible sources of 
such a difference in estimated elasticity. For one, the Japanese economy is more bank-dependent 
than the U.S. economy. Another is that the size of financial shocks and the vulnerability of 
financial and non-financial firms to financial shocks in Japan during this particular period were 
likely to be larger than the U.S. counterparts during the period that Driscoll (2004) and Ashcraft 
(2006) examine. 
 
4.  Robustness Checks 
A possible criticism of the baseline specifications might be that they fail to control for 
heterogeneity in the synchronicity of economic cycles between local prefectures and cities. One 
might conjecture that some local economies are more synchronized with urban economies in 
cities simply because their economic performance depends heavily on the demand from cities. 
Although we cannot completely rule out the possibility that our results are driven by the 
heterogeneity in trade linkages, we make various attempts to address these concerns in this 
section. 
 
A. Geographical Distance 
  An alternative story that accounts for our results is that financially integrated prefectures 
might have closer trade linkages with cities than financially isolated prefectures. Ideally, we 
would like to use data on the volume of intra-national trade between prefectures to account for  
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the trade linkages. Unfortunately, no such data are available. However, international trade 
literature suggests that geographical distance is one of the most important determinants of 
economic interactions between countries (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Deardorff, 1998).  
This stylized fact, if it is true for intra-national trade within Japan, is somewhat 
worrisome to us because city banks tend to have more branches around the metropolitan areas 
(Figure 2) so that prefectures nearby the major cities have higher shares of city banks relative to 
other remotely located prefectures. In the meantime, prefectures nearby the major cities may 
have common business opportunities and economic trading flows with those large cities.  
To correct for this potential bias, we construct three measures of geographical distance.
5 
The first measure is straight distance between prefecture i and each of the six major cities. The 
second measure is the average distance between prefecture i and all of six major cities calculated 
as follows: 
 
1 (_){ ( ) ( ) 6 DISTANCE AVG CITY DISTANCE TOKYO DISTANCE YOKOHAMA   
                            () ( ) DISTANCE NAGOYA DISTANCE OSAKA   
                                          () ( ) } DISTANCE KYOTO DISTANCE KOBE    
 
The third measure is the minimum distance to the closest city from prefecture i calculated as 
follows: 
 
(_ ) m i n { ( ) , ( ) DISTANCE CLOSEST CITY DISTANCE TOKYO DISTANCE YOKOHAMA    
        , ( ), ( ) DISTANCE NAGOYA DISTANCE OSAKA  
   , ( ), ( )} DISTANCE KYOTO DISTANCE KOBE  
 
                                                            
5 Distance between prefectures is defined as the straight geographical distance between kencho shozaichi (the 
locations of the prefectural government). It is obtained from google map (http://maps.google.com/).   
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We interact these distance measures with the output growth of the corresponding cities to 
capture the trade linkages. We expect that the output of prefectures closer to cities responds more 
elastically to output fluctuations in cities; that is, the coefficient on the interaction of the distance 
measure and the city output growth should be negative.  
Table 4 reports the results of the IV regressions.
6 First of all, notice that the interactions 
of the distance measures and output have negative coefficients (columns 2-3 and 5-6) and also 
statistically significant (columns 5). This is consistent to our prior expectation that the further a 
prefecture is from the cities, the less economic correlation there is between the prefecture and the 
cities. These results are reassuring in that our distance variables are likely to be capturing some 
of the unobserved heterogeneity in synchronization of business cycles between local peripheral 
economies and cites. 
 Our main results are statistically robust even after including these additional distance 
controls. The coefficients on ΔLocal Land Price and ΔCity Land Price*City Bank Share remain 
statistically significant with positive signs (columns 1-3). Loan growth instrumented by the 
interaction of the land price growth of the major cities and the city bank share has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on local economic output (columns 4-6). These coefficients are also 
similar in magnitudes to those obtained in the baseline model reported in Table 3. In sum, the 
statistical relationship between banking integration and sensitivity of the local credit and output 
cycle to city land price shocks is unlikely to be driven by unobserved heterogeneity in trade 
linkages. 
 
B. Similarity in GDP between Prefectures 
                                                            
6 The results of reduced-form regressions of income growth are reported in Table A2 in Appendix. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those in Table 3.  
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  International trade literature also shows that countries with similar income tend to trade 
more (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Our data suggest that prefectures close to the large major 
prefectures have a relatively high level of GDP per capita (Figure 3) just as they have relatively 
high presence of nation-wide city banks (Figure 2). Again, if income similarity is an important 
determinant of intra-national trade linkages within Japan, our results might be biased due to a 
close correlation between banking integration and unobserved trade linkages with the major 
cities.  
To address the issue, we calculate the absolute difference in GDP per capita between 
each prefecture and Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo. This variable is again 
interacted with the output growth of the cities to capture heterogeneity in trade linkages.
 We 
expect that the prefectures that are similar to cities in terms of income levels have stronger trade 
linkages, and as a result, their output fluctuation is more closely related to that of cities (i.e., the 
coefficient on the interaction of the income difference and the output growth in cities should be 
negative). 
  Tables 5 reports the results of the IV regressions with these additional controls.
7 Even 
after including the controls, the results largely conform to the main findings from the baseline 
model that land price shocks in the major cities are transmitted through city banks and have a 
significant impact on lending (columns 1-2), which in turn has a statistically significant positive 
correlation with local economic output (columns 3-4). The coefficient on the interaction of the 
income difference and the output growth of cities turns out to be negative as expected.  
 
C. Contemporaneous (Spatial) Correlation 
                                                            
7 The results of the reduced-form regression of the income growth are reported in Table A3 in Appendix. The results 
are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3.  
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  Thus far, we assume that error terms are independent across prefectures. However, if 
unobservable factors are contemporaneously (or spatially) correlated across prefectures, then 
each observation in the data contains less information, which needs to be incorporated when 
estimating the standard errors of the coefficients. In Table 6, we show the results with standard 
error corrected for possible spatial correlation by utilizing parametric panel corrected standard 
errors (Beck and Katz, 1995) and non-parametric Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Dricoll and 
Kraay, 1998). These adjustments of standard errors for contemporaneous correlations do not 
materially alter the results. 
 
D. Impact on Small Business Firms 
The literature on relationship lending shows that small opaque firms depend on a long-
term relationship with banks for external finance precisely because they are not able to overcome 
an adverse selection problem in arm length financial transaction (Diamond, 1984, 1991; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995). The main cost of a close exclusive relationship with a 
single bank, however, is that firms will have limited financing options when their banks are 
unwilling or unable to extend credit (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). This theoretical consideration 
helps us check whether the correlation between output and loans is also causation. Since large 
firms have more financing options than small firms, we should observe that it is small businesses, 
not large businesses, which respond sensitively to the financial cycle. 
One important consideration is that banking literature has shown that large banks have 
comparative disadvantages in collecting “soft information” relative to small banks and thus 
depend largely on publicly available information when making lending decisions (Berger, 
Klapper, and Udell, 2001; Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, 2005). In Japan, however,  
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as large firms shifted from bank financing to open market financing due to development and 
liberalization of financial markets, city banks have increased small business lending significantly. 
In particular, the proportion of small business lending of city banks has, in fact, increased by 
more than twenty percentage points over 1977-1995 (Ogawa and Kitasaka, 2000). Thus, this 
particular development in Japan’s corporate financing implies that the shocks to large city bank 
might have a significant impact on small business firms. 
Table 7 reports the results of the IV regressions for both small and large business firms.
8 
Dependent variables are the growth rate of the number of small and large business firms in each 
prefecture.
9 Since the data on the number of small and large business firms are available every 
five years from 1981 to 2001, all of other growth variables are recalculated into five-year 
frequency.  
The results are generally in line with our expectation that the coefficients on LOAN are 
positive and statistically significant for growth of small business firms with the controls (Panel B, 
columns 2-3) while they are insignificant for growth of large business firms (Panel B, columns 4-
6), suggesting that the land price shock of the major cities transmitted by city banks had severe 
adverse impacts on small business firms but not on large business firms. 
These results also indicate that regional banks did not seem to provide loans to the 
abandoned small business firms that were somehow dependent on city banks and negatively 
affected by the credit crunch. This could occur if those opaque city-bank-dependent-borrowers 
do not have a close tie with small banks and thus small banks are unwilling to extend credit due 
to its informational asymmetry. 
                                                            
8 The results of the reduced-form equations are reported in Table A4. 
9 We define small business firms as firms with less than or equal to fifty employees and large business as firms with 
more than fifty employees. We also experimented with different cut-off points (30 and 100 employees) for the 
robustness check. The results are qualitatively similar (Tables A5 and A6)  
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5.  Conclusion 
Large financial institutions are often considered a source of financial and economic 
stability. They have geographically diversified assets, have better access to large markets for 
liquidity, and thus are less vulnerable to local idiosyncratic shocks compared to unit banks that 
operate locally. These institutions, however, can be a source of instability if they manage risk 
poorly and, as a consequence, cut back on loan supply in local economies during economic 
downturn.  
This paper uses a panel data set of Japan’s prefectures from 1981 to 2003 and presents a 
series of evidence that indicates a dark side of large financial institutions. We find that the 
presence of city banks does not seem to have lessened the effects of local financial shocks on 
local economies. On the contrary, we find evidence that nation-wide city banks aggressively 
transmitted financial shocks that originated from the major cities to local peripheral economies. 
Furthermore, the financial shocks transmitted by city banks had severe adverse effects on small 
business firms. These results suggest that large financial institutions can be a source of financial 
and economic volatility when they elect to take concentrated risk and spread out the impacts of 
financial shocks across geographical and economic boundaries. 
Our findings contrast sharply with Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) and Demyanyk, 
Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007) which show that banking integration contributed to a reduction 
in economic volatility in the U.S. One can speculate on why Japanese experience differs so 
starkly from the U.S. experience. In theory, Japan’s city banks should have been able to mitigate 
the shock by raising external funds in open markets, thereby continuing to supply loans to viable  
  22
borrowers.
10 However, in the case of Japan, Japan’s city banks were not managing risk properly 
when there were large financial shocks. Thus, it might have been a combination of large 
financial shocks and lax risk management that distinguished the Japanese experience.  
Furthermore, the strong “home bias” of Japanese banks may also have contributed to the 
seemingly unnatural allocation of capital. Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) and Peek and 
Rosengren (2005) document that Japanese banks reduced lending for relatively viable borrowers 
and reallocated it to so-called zombie firms that are affiliated with the banks in cross-
shareholdings (i.e., keiretsu group). Peek and Rosengren (2000) also show that Japanese banks 
reduced significant supplies of loans in the U.S. real estate markets in response to the collapse of 
the bubble in Japan although the U.S. borrowers were financially stronger and there were more 
profitable lending opportunities in the U.S. Hence, our results might also be a by-product of 
peculiar corporate governance structure of Japanese banks that favored bank-affiliated borrowers 
within a business group at the expense of small independent firms.   
As a final note, the evidence presented in this paper does not necessarily discourage 
banking integration nor promote segmented banking systems. A large literature on banking 
integration suggests, rather strongly, that competitive financial system tend to have positive 
effect on capital allocation in the long run (e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales, 2004; Bertrand, Schoar, and Thesmar, 2007). 
                                                            
10 The empirical work on the bank lending channel in the U.S. corroborates such a view (Kishan and Opiela, 2000; 
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Figure 1
Land Price Decline over 1991-2003
Note: 6 major prefectures are boardered with red lines










189.25% - 240.68% 
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Figure 2
City Bank Share over 1991-2003
Note: 6 major prefectures are boardered with red lines










53.11% - 71.90% 
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Figure 3
GDP per capita over 1991-2003
Note: 6 major prefectures are boardered with red lines














Land price growth over 1980-1991 and 1991-2003 (six major prefectures are bolded in red) 
Prefecture Code  Name  1980-1991  1991-2003 
1 hokkaido  138.5%  -133.2% 
2 aomori  55.2%  -81.5% 
3 iwate  48.0%  -33.5% 
4 miyagi  208.7%  -153.5% 
5 akita  51.7%  -60.7% 
6 yamagata  79.0%  -58.1% 
7 fukushima  124.0%  -119.9% 
8 ibaraki  109.5%  -102.3% 
9 tochigi  120.5%  -129.2% 
10 gunma  141.8%  -130.6% 
11 saitama  191.4%  -163.0% 
12 chiba  215.8%  -219.8% 
13 tokyo  238.5%  -179.7% 
14 kanagawa  203.4%  -159.4% 
15 niigata  133.4%  -126.2% 
16 toyama  138.6%  -133.4% 
17 ishikawa  135.4%  -125.7% 
18 fukui  85.4%  -97.9% 
19 yamanashi  149.2%  -154.1% 
20 nagano  90.3%  -107.1% 
21 gifu  115.9% -128.5% 
22 shizuoka  174.4%  -153.3% 
23 aichi  241.3% -186.3% 
24 mie  123.6% -103.8% 
25 shiga  170.4%  -135.4% 
26 kyoto  210.6%  -189.3% 
27 osaka  259.8%  -240.7% 
28 hyogo  173.5%  -169.7% 
29 nara  209.1% -169.2% 
30 wakayama  96.4%  -122.7% 
31 tottori  105.1%  -52.9% 
32 shimane  49.6%  -18.3% 
33 okayama  126.9%  -147.7% 
34 hiroshima  157.8%  -120.5% 
35 yamaguchi  104.9%  -53.5% 
36 tokushima  46.8%  -73.2% 
37 kagawa  95.9%  -124.8% 
38 ehime  100.2%  -102.1% 
39 kochi  72.2%  -43.6% 
40 fukuoka  194.8%  -117.8% 
41 saga  54.5%  -38.2% 
42 nagasaki  113.5%  -103.1% 
43 kumamoto  150.6%  -122.9% 
44 oita  103.3%  -85.8% 
45 miyazaki  74.3%  -60.9% 
46 kagoshima  68.8%  -68.0% 
47 okinawa  191.7%  -130.0% 
- Average  124.0%  -122.9% 




City bank share over 1980-1991 and 1991-2003 (six major prefectures are bolded in red) 
Prefecture Code  Name  1980-1991  1991-2003 
1 hokkaido  30.20%  19.00% 
2 aomori  1.10%  1.00% 
3 iwate  1.10%  0.90% 
4 miyagi  4.00%  3.40% 
5 akita  0.70%  0.60% 
6 yamagata  0.90%  0.80% 
7 fukushima  2.10%  1.80% 
8 ibaraki  5.20%  3.40% 
9 tochigi  8.30%  5.10% 
10 gunma  9.60%  6.20% 
11 saitama  58.60%  53.10% 
12 chiba  28.10%  25.90% 
13 tokyo  69.20%  71.90% 
14 kanagawa  44.70%  45.40% 
15 niigata  2.50%  1.80% 
16 toyama  1.80%  1.50% 
17 ishikawa  2.30%  2.10% 
18 fukui  1.20%  1.10% 
19 yamanashi  8.60%  5.70% 
20 nagano  6.90%  5.30% 
21 gifu  4.70%  3.60% 
22 shizuoka  6.70%  5.90% 
23 aichi  33.90%  30.40% 
24 mie  5.20%  4.40% 
25 shiga  3.70%  2.50% 
26 kyoto  24.00%  20.90% 
27 osaka  41.60%  40.90% 
28 hyogo  39.30%  36.60% 
29 nara  16.80%  16.30% 
30 wakayama  5.20%  4.60% 
31 tottori  0.80%  1.10% 
32 shimane  1.90%  1.00% 
33 okayama  4.10%  2.90% 
34 hiroshima  4.90%  3.40% 
35 yamaguchi  3.50%  3.00% 
36 tokushima  1.20%  1.10% 
37 kagawa  2.70%  3.00% 
38 ehime  1.60%  1.40% 
39 kochi  1.40%  1.30% 
40 fukuoka  5.20%  3.90% 
41 saga  1.60%  1.40% 
42 nagasaki  1.70%  1.30% 
43 kumamoto  2.40%  2.20% 
44 oita  1.10%  1.10% 
45 miyazaki  0.60%  0.60% 
46 kagoshima  2.50%  1.90% 
47 okinawa  0.30%  0.50% 
- Average  3.70%  3.00%  
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Table 3 
Relationship between land prices, city bank share, loans and output from 1981-2003  
Columns 1-4 report the results of fixed-effect regressions and Panels A and B in column 5 report the results of the first stage and second 
stage of an IV regression. LOAN and GDP represent growth of local loan and output, respectively. ∆Local Land Price is growth of local 
land price index and ∆City Land Price is growth of land price index for six major cities. City Bank Share is a ratio of the number of city 
bank branches in a prefecture to total branches of city banks and regional banks in a prefecture. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
within each prefecture. F-Statistics in column 5 is Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (weak identification test). 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)     (5) 
  Fixed-Effect Regression    Panel A (1st Stage) 
Dependent Variable  LOAN LOAN  GDP  GDP    LOAN 
ΔLocal Land Price  0.0772***  0.0569***  0.0220***  0.0142**    0.0569*** 
 (0.0164)  (0.0151)  (0.00637)  (0.00628)    (0.0151) 
ΔLocal Land Price*City Bank Share    0.0380    0.0128    0.0380 
   (0.0794)   (0.0376)   (0.0794) 
ΔCity Land Price*City Bank Share    0.261**    0.103*    0.261** 
   (0.121)    (0.0560)    (0.121) 
Constant 0.00173  0.000984  0.00295*  0.00267     
 (0.00316)  (0.00304)  (0.00175)  (0.00173)     
R-squared 0.895  0.897  0.714  0.717    0.897 
F-Statistic 348.1  288.3  279.6  303.3    4.662 
            
           Panel B (2nd Stage) 
Dependent Variable            GDP 
LOAN           0.395*** 
           (0.0998) 
ΔLocal Land Price            -0.00827 
           (0.00820) 
ΔLocal Land Price*City Bank Share          -0.00218 
           (0.0458) 
Number of prefecture  41  41  41  41    41 
Observations 943  943  943  943      943 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Relationship between land prices, city bank share, loans and output with distance controls from 1981-2003 (Panel Fixed-Effect IV) 
LOAN and GDP represents growth of private loans and GDP. DISTANCE(TOKYO, YOKOHAMA, NAGOYA, KYOTO, OSAKA, KOBE) represents the distance to those 
cities in the parenthesis from each prefecture. DISTANCE(CLOSEST_CITY, AVG_CITY) is the distance to the closest city out of the six major cities from each prefecture and 
the average distance of the six major cities, respectively. GDP(CLOSEST_CITY, AVG_CITY) is output of the closest major city and the average output of the six major cities, 
respectively. The reported F-Statistics in columns 1-3 are Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (weak identification test). 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Panel A (1st Stage of IV Regression)    Panel B (2nd Stage of IV Regression) 
Dependent  Variable  LOAN  LOAN  LOAN    GDP GDP GDP 
∆City Land Price*City Bank Share   0.241**  0.249**  0.263**         
 (0.106)  (0.0967)  (0.102)         
LOAN         0.328*** 0.379*** 0.419*** 
          (0.113) (0.109) (0.104) 
∆Local Land Price   0.0545***  0.0540***  0.0558***    -0.00368  -0.00838  -0.00976 
  (0.0152)  (0.0137) (0.0140)    (0.00854) (0.00817) (0.00796) 
∆Local Land Price*City Bank Share   0.0384  0.0339  0.0248    -0.00168  -0.00305  -0.00934 
  (0.0719)  (0.0686)  (0.0705)    (0.0455) (0.0464) (0.0484) 
DISTANCE(TOKYO)*GDP(TOKYO) -0.000118        3.22e-05     
 (0.000374)        (7.88e-05)     
DISTANCE(YOKOHAMA)*GDP(YOKOHAMA) 8.71e-05        0.000266***     
 (0.000352)        (9.75e-05)     
DISTANCE(NAGOYA)*GDP(NAGOYA)  -0.000332       0.000239    
 (0.000314)        (0.000167)     
DISTANCE(KYOTO)*GDP(KYOTO) -0.000148        -0.000103     
 (0.000241)        (0.000128)     
DISTANCE(OSAKA)*GDP(OSAKA) 0.000180        -0.000163     
 (0.000478)        (0.000155)     
DISTANCE(KOBE)*GDP(KOBE) -9.77e-05        6.01e-05     
 (0.000611)        (0.000174)     
DISTANCE(AVG_CITY)*GDP(AVG_CITY)    -0.000423      -0.000155*  
   (0.000327)        (8.88e-05)   
GDP(CLOSEST_CITY)     -0.0236        -0.0718 
     (0.113)        (0.0752) 
DISTANCE(CLOSEST_CITY)*GDP(CLOSEST_CITY)     -0.000281        -9.49e-05 
     (0.000451)        (0.000149) 
F-Statistic  5.213 6.628  6.592       
Observations  943  943  943    943 943 943 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses  
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Table 5 
Relationship between land prices, city bank share, loans and output with distance and GDP 
controls from 1981-2003 (Panel Fixed-Effect IV) 
LOAN and GDP represent growth of private loans and GDP. GDP(TOKYO, KNAGAWA, AICHI, KYOTO, 
OSAKA, HYOGO) represents annual output growth of the prefecture in the parenthesis. 
DISTANCE(CLOSEST_CITY) is distance to the closest city out of the six major cities from each prefecture 
and GDP(CLOSEST_CITY) is output of the closest major city. DIFF[GDPpercapita(TOKYO, KNAGAWA, 
AICHI, KYOTO, OSAKA, HYOGO)] is the absolute difference in GDP per capital between each prefecture 
and the major prefecture in the parenthesis. The reported F-Statistics are Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (weak 
identification test). 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
  Panel A (1st Stage)  Panel B (2nd Stage) 
Dependent Variable LOAN  LOAN  GDP  GDP 
∆City Land Price*City Bank Share  0.233**  0.239**     
 (0.107)  (0.103)     
LOAN     0.362***  0.394*** 
     (0.123)  (0.113) 
∆Local Land Price  0.0416*** 0.0423*** -0.0104  -0.0111 
 (0.0138)  (0.0136)  (0.00835)  (0.00817) 
∆Local Land Price*City Bank Share  0.102  0.0957  0.0188  0.00952 
 (0.0782)  (0.0754)  (0.0530)  (0.0568) 
GDP(CLOSEST_CITY)   -0.0461    -0.0794 
   (0.123)    (0.0751) 
DISTANCE(CLOSEST_CITY)*GDP(CLOSEST_CITY)   -5.30e-05    -2.99e-05 
   (0.000454)   (0.000145) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(TOKYO)]*GDP(TOKYO) -0.430*  -0.411*  -0.0939  -0.0622 
 (0.247)  (0.205)  (0.132)  (0.129) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(KANAGAWA)]*GDP(KANAGAWA) 0.197  0.189  0.259**  0.239** 
 (0.194)  (0.199)  (0.117)  (0.121) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(AICHI)]*GDP(AICHI) -0.152*  -0.142  -0.178**  -0.163** 
 (0.0806)  (0.0980)  (0.0695)  (0.0785) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(KYOTO)]*GDP(KYOTO) 0.0453  0.0319  -0.140  -0.159 
 (0.123)  (0.112)  (0.110)  (0.115) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(OSAKA)]*GDP(OSAKA) -0.00932 -0.0118  -0.0277  -0.0285 
 (0.169)  (0.155)  (0.0781)  (0.0760) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(HYOGO)]*GDP(HYOGO) -0.0189  -0.00570  -0.00472  0.00950 
 (0.418)  (0.388)  (0.157)  (0.157) 
R-squared 0.901  0.901  0.646  0.628 
F-Statistic 4.734  5.415     
Number of prefecture  41  41  41  41 
Observations 943  943  943  943 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses  
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Table 6 
Relationship between land prices, city bank share, loans and output with standard errors adjusted for contemporaneous correlation from 
1981-2003  
Columns 1-4 report the results of panel corrected standard errors. Columns 1-4 report the results of Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. LOAN and GDP represent growth of local loan 
and output, respectively. ∆Local Land Price is growth of local land price index and ∆City Land Price is growth of land price index for six major cities. City Bank Share is a ratio of 
the number of city bank branches in a prefecture to total branches of city banks and regional banks in a prefecture. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Panel-Corrected Standard Errors  Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors 
Dependent Variable  LOAN  LOAN  GDP  GDP  LOAN  LOAN  GDP  GDP 
∆Local Land Price  0.0772***  0.0569**  0.0220***  0.0142*  0.0772***  0.0569***  0.0220***  0.0142*** 
 (0.0229)  (0.0225)  (0.00797)  (0.00855)  (0.0146) (0.0129)  (0.00514)  (0.00522) 
∆Local Land Price*City Bank Share    0.0380    0.0128    0.0380    0.0128 
   (0.143)  (0.0392)  (0.0839)  (0.0267) 
∆City Land Price*City Bank Share    0.261*    0.103**    0.261*    0.103*** 
   (0.157)   (0.0410)   (0.149)   (0.0281) 
Constant -0.00854  -0.0110  -0.000797  -0.00173 -0.00854  -0.0110 -0.000797 -0.00173 
  (0.00824) (0.00878) (0.00247) (0.00291) (0.00682) (0.00909) (0.00251) (0.00345) 
Observations  943 943 943 943 943 943 943 943 
Number  of  Prefectures  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
R-squared  0.895 0.898 0.718 0.721 0.895 0.898 0.718 0.721 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  




Relationship between land prices, city bank share, loans and small (less than and equal to 50 employees) and large 
business firm growth with distance and GDP controls from 1981-2001 (Panel Fixed-Effect IV) 
LOAN represents the growth of private loans.  SMALL and LARGE represent the growth of the number of small and large business firms, 
respectively (small firms are those with less than and equal to 50 employees). DISTANCE CONTROL shows whether or not the 
estimated equation includes distance controls (the interaction of the distance to the closest city and its GDP). GDP CONTROL shows 
whether or not the estimated equation includes GDP controls (absolute difference between prefectures and the six major cities). The first 
stage results for LARGE are not reported since they are identical to Panel A. The reported F-Statistics are Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic (weak identification test). 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Panel A (1st Stage of IV Regression)     
Dependent Variable  LOAN LOAN LOAN       
∆City Land Price*City Bank Share  0.224  0.300*  0.303*       
 (0.183)  (0.153)  (0.156)       
∆Local Land Price  0.0387**  0.0399***  0.0202       
  (0.0163) (0.0137) (0.0156)       
∆Local Land Price*City Bank Share  0.0433  -0.0752  -0.0496       
 (0.236)  (0.192)  (0.202)       
DISTANCE CONTROL  NO  YES  YES       
GDP CONTROL  NO  NO  YES       
R-squared 0.788  0.802  0.833       
F-Statistic 1.509  3.840  3.750       
            
  Panel B (2nd Stage of IV Regression) 
Dependent Variable  SMALL50  SMALL50 SMALL50 LARGE50 LARGE50 LARGE50 
LOAN 0.870  0.695**  0.684** 0.628  0.179  0.0749 
 (0.595)  (0.332)  (0.299)  (0.584)  (0.569)  (0.551) 
∆Local  Land  Price  -0.0376 -0.0319 -0.0278  -0.00582  0.00304 -0.0147 
  (0.0322) (0.0224) (0.0213) (0.0414) (0.0369) (0.0334) 
∆Local Land Price*City Bank Share 0.0752  0.137  0.126  0.377**  0.451**  0.449** 
 (0.187)  (0.0950)  (0.0940)  (0.175)  (0.186)  (0.200) 
DISTANCE CONTROL  NO  YES YES NO YES YES 
GDP CONTROL  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Number of prefecture  41  41  41  41  41  41 
Observations  164 164 164 164 164 164 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 







Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Observations
      overall  between  within     
∆Local Land Price  .00542  .15804  .01114  .15766  -.78170  .89627  N =     943 
∆City Land Price  -.00659  .18513  0  .18514  -.27779  .34899  N =     943 
City Bank Share  .05552  .09863  .09784  .01946  0  .59453  N =     943 
LOAN .03680  .09932  .00804  .09900  -.42664  .54553  N =     943 
GDP  .03072  .03391  .00410  .033668  -.06717  .16826  N =     943 
DISTANCE(CLOSEST_CITY)  268.37  239.20  242.05  0  8.0292  1187.3  N =     943 
DISTANCE(AVG_CITY) 427.30 245.40  248.31  0  154.26  1344.6  N =     943 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(TOKYO)]  3.3928  .78748  .37160  .69662  1.4580  4.8201  N =     943 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(KANAGAWA)] .40509  .28740  .25384  .14025  .00016  1.2329  N =     943 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(AICHI)]  1.2496  .43437  .37160  .23200  .26230  2.4106  N =     943 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(KYOTO)]  .38216  .27508  .25054  .11985  .00074  1.2018  N =     943 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(OSAKA)]  .99735  .43525  .37160  .23362  .02761  2.2072  N =     943 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(HYOGO)]  .38394  .28690  .23729  .16528  .00013  1.3784  N =     943 
Growth of Small Business Firms  -.00594  .03735  .01619  .03373  -.07910  .10657  N =     164 
Growth of Large Business Firms  .06838  .13201  .05127  .12185  -.24512  .47692  N =     164  
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Table A2 
Relationship between land prices, city bank share and output with distance controls from 
1981-2003 (Panel Fixed-Effect) 
DISTANCE(TOKYO, YOKOHAMA, NAGOYA, KYOTO, OSAKA, KOBE) and GDP(TOKYO, 
KNAGAWA, AICHI, KYOTO, OSAKA, HYOGO) represent the distance to the place from each 
prefecture and output of the place, respectively. DISTANCE(CLOSEST_CITY) is the distance to the 
closest city out of the six major cities from each prefecture and GDP(CLOSEST_CITY) is the output of 
the closest major city. DISTANCE(AVG_CITY) is the average distance to all the six major cities from 
each prefecture and GDP(AVG_CITY) is the average output of the six major cities. 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable  GDP  GDP  GDP 
∆City Land Price*City Bank Share  0.0142**  0.0121*  0.0136** 
 (0.00660)  (0.00622)  (0.00609) 
∆Local Land Price  0.0109  0.00979  0.00103 
 (0.0355)  (0.0342)  (0.0353) 
∆Local Land Price*City Bank Share  0.0791*  0.0942**  0.110** 
 (0.0410)  (0.0420)  (0.0450) 
DISTANCE(TOKYO)*GDP(TOKYO) -6.45e-06     
 (0.000107)     
DISTANCE(YOKOHAMA)*GDP(YOKOHAMA) -0.000238**    
 (0.000110)     
DISTANCE(NAGOYA)*GDP(NAGOYA) 0.000130     
 (0.000151)     
DISTANCE(KYOTO)*GDP(KYOTO) -0.000151     
 (0.000104)     
DISTANCE(OSAKA)*GDP(OSAKA) -0.000104     
 (0.000119)     
DISTANCE(KOBE)*GDP(KOBE) 2.81e-05     
 (6.46e-05)     
DISTANCE(AVG_CITY)*GDP(AVG_CITY)   0.000315***  
   (8.79e-05)   
GDP(CLOSEST_CITY)     -0.0817 
     (0.0568) 
DISTANCE(CLOSEST_CITY)*GDP(CLOSEST_CITY)     0.000213*** 
     (6.27e-05) 
Number of prefecture  41  41  41 
Observations 943  943  943 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Relationship between land prices, city bank share and output with distance and GDP 
controls from 1981-2003 (Panel Fixed-Effect) 
GDP(TOKYO, KNAGAWA, AICHI, KYOTO, OSAKA, HYOGO) represents annual output growth of 
the prefecture in the parenthesis. DISTANCE(CLOSEST_CITY) is the distance to the closest city out of 
the six major cities from each prefecture and GDP(CLOSEST_CITY) is the output of the closest major 
city. DIFF[GDPpercapita(TOKYO, KNAGAWA, AICHI, KYOTO, OSAKA, HYOGO)] is the absolute 
difference in GDP per capital between each prefecture and the major prefecture in the parenthesis. 
   (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable  GDP  GDP 
∆City Land Price*City Bank Share  0.0843  0.0940* 
 (0.0520)  (0.0471) 
∆Local Land Price  0.00465  0.00561 
 (0.00677)  (0.00683) 
∆Local Land Price*City Bank Share  0.0559  0.0472 
 (0.0340)  (0.0331) 
GDP(CLOSEST_CITY)   -0.0976 
   (0.0587) 
DISTANCE(CLOSEST_CITY)*GDP(CLOSEST_CITY)   -5.08e-05 
   (8.99e-05) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(TOKYO)]*GDP(TOKYO) -0.249***  -0.224** 
 (0.0895)  (0.0858) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(KANAGAWA)]*GDP(KANAGAWA) 0.330***  0.313*** 
 (0.110)  (0.111) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(AICHI)]*GDP(AICHI) -0.233***  -0.219*** 
 (0.0558)  (0.0558) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(KYOTO)]*GDP(KYOTO) -0.124  -0.146 
 (0.106)  (0.110) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(OSAKA)]*GDP(OSAKA) -0.0310  -0.0331 
 (0.0798)  (0.0759) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(HYOGO)]*GDP(HYOGO) -0.0115  0.00726 
 (0.0735)  (0.0753) 
R-squared 0.737  0.740 
F-Statistic 768.1  1075 
Number of prefecture  41  41 
Observations 943  943 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses  
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Table A4 
Relationship between land prices, city bank share and small (less than and equal to 50 employees) and large business firm growth with distance and 
GDP controls from 1981-2001 (Panel Fixed-Effect) 
SMALL50 and LARGE50 represent the growth of the number of small and large business firms, respectively (small firms are those with less than and equal to 50 employees). 
GDP(TOKYO, KNAGAWA, AICHI, KYOTO, OSAKA, HYOGO) represents annual output growth of the prefecture in the parenthesis. DISTANCE(CLOSEST_CITY) is 
the distance to the closest city out of the six major cities from each prefecture and GDP(CLOSEST_CITY) is the output of the closest major city. 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(TOKYO, KNAGAWA, AICHI, KYOTO, OSAKA, HYOGO)] is the absolute difference in GDP per capital between  each prefecture and the major 
prefecture in the parenthesis. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent Variable  SMALL50  SMALL50 SMALL50 LARGE50  LARGE50 LARGE50 
∆City Land Price*City Bank Share  0.195***  0.208***  0.207***  0.141  0.0536  0.0227 
  (0.0513) (0.0535) (0.0631) (0.220) (0.198)  (0.185) 
∆Local Land Price  -0.00388  -0.00417  -0.0140  0.0185  0.0102  -0.0132 
  (0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0150) (0.0271)  (0.0275)  (0.0319) 
∆Local Land Price*City Bank Share  0.113  0.0847  0.0918  0.404  0.437*  0.445* 
  (0.0672) (0.0797) (0.0915) (0.271) (0.252)  (0.241) 
GDP(CLOSEST_CITY)   0.0228  -0.0124    0.406**  0.568*** 
   (0.0688)  (0.0627)  (0.168)  (0.169) 
DISTANCE(CLOSEST_CITY)*GDP(CLOSEST_CITY)   -0.000140  -1.41e-05    -0.000241  -0.000503 
   (0.000217)  (0.000190)   (0.000296)  (0.000330) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(TOKYO)]*GDP(TOKYO)     -0.614**    -1.171* 
     (0.228)      (0.622) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(KANAGAWA)]*GDP(KANAGAWA)     0.116      -0.248 
     (0.297)      (0.844) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(AICHI)]*GDP(AICHI)     -2.048***      -3.224 
     (0.625)      (1.975) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(KYOTO)]*GDP(KYOTO)     -0.796***      -0.941* 
     (0.235)      (0.541) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(OSAKA)]*GDP(OSAKA)     3.368***      7.406** 
     (1.127)      (3.356) 
DIFF[GDPpercapita(HYOGO)]*GDP(HYOGO)     0.638**      0.524 
     (0.273)      (0.793) 
Constant  -0.0547*** -0.0551*** -0.0461***  0.00495  0.0122*  0.0339 
  (0.00227) (0.00237)  (0.0120) (0.00561)  (0.00611) (0.0318) 
R-squared  0.877 0.878 0.903 0.732  0.746  0.767 
F-Statistic  126.8 108.2 127.8 81.49  61.53  53.55 
Number of prefecture  41  41  41  41  41  41 
Observations  164 164 164 164  164  164 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses  
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Table A5 
Relationship between land prices, city bank share and small (less than and equal to 30 employees) and large business 
firm growth with distance and GDP controls from 1981-2001 (Panel Fixed-Effect IV) 
SMALL30 and LARGE30 represent the growth of the number of small and large business firms, respectively (small firms are those with 
less than 30 employees). DISTANCE CONTROL shows whether or not the estimated equation includes distance controls (the interaction 
of the distance to the closest city and its GDP). GDP CONTROL shows whether or not the estimated equation includes GDP controls 
(absolute difference between prefectures and the six major cities). The first stage results for LARGE are not reported since they are 
identical to Panel A. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Panel B (2nd Stage of IV Regression) 
Dependent Variable  SMALL30  SMALL30 SMALL30 LARGE30 LARGE30 LARGE30 
LOAN 0.882  0.701**  0.688** 0.865*  0.584  0.555 
  (0.618) (0.343) (0.306) (0.474) (0.418) (0.360) 
∆Local  Land  Price  -0.0390 -0.0331 -0.0282 0.0167  0.0224 0.00256 
  (0.0329) (0.0227) (0.0215) (0.0387) (0.0329) (0.0344) 
∆Local Land Price*City Bank Share 0.0687  0.133  0.120  0.288*  0.337**  0.348** 
  (0.195) (0.0976)  (0.0958)  (0.156) (0.172) (0.177) 
DISTANCE CONTROL  NO  YES YES NO YES YES 
GDP CONTROL  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Number of prefecture  41  41  41  41  41  41 
Observations  164 164 164 164 164 164 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses  
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Table A6 
Relationship between land prices, city bank share and small (less than and equal to 100 employees) and large 
business firm growth with distance and GDP controls from 1981-2001 (Panel Fixed-Effect IV) 
SMALL100 and LARGE100 represent the growth of the number of small and large business firms, respectively (small firms are those with 
less than and equal to 100 employees). DISTANCE CONTROL shows whether or not the estimated equation includes distance controls 
(the interaction of the distance to the closest city and its GDP). GDP CONTROL shows whether or not the estimated equation includes 
GDP controls (absolute difference between prefectures and the six major cities). The first stage results for LARGE are not reported since 
they are identical to Panel A. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Panel B (2nd Stage of IV Regression) 
Dependent Variable  SMALL100  SMALL100 SMALL100 LARGE100 LARGE100 LARGE100 
LOAN 0.867  0.688**  0.675**  -0.731 -0.678 -0.663 
  (0.585) (0.323) (0.292) (1.717) (1.053) (1.007) 
∆Local  Land  Price  -0.0378  -0.0320  -0.0280 0.0910 0.0826 0.0363 
  (0.0320) (0.0222) (0.0214) (0.0818) (0.0614) (0.0589) 
∆Local Land Price*City Bank Share 0.0825  0.145  0.133  0.165  0.0459  0.0456 
  (0.184) (0.0932)  (0.0925)  (0.549) (0.327) (0.340) 
DISTANCE CONTROL  NO  YES YES NO YES YES 
GDP CONTROL  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Number of prefecture  41  41  41  41  41  41 
Observations  164 164 164 164 164 164 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 